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STUDENT COMMENT
The Triangle Claims Another Victim: A
Watery Grave for the Original Bermuda
Agreement Principles
KATHLEEN
I.

K.

MACDEVITT*

INTRODUCTION

British Airways in 1973 carried the equivalent of five
empty Boeing 747 jumbo jets daily between New York and
London.' In that same year scheduled flights across the North
Atlantic carried several million empty seats.' Overcapacity on
the North Atlantic had reached serious proportions. 3 The provisions governing capacity in the 1946 bilateral agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning
scheduled air transportation no longer operated to limit capacity effectively.
On June 22, 1976, the British denounced the 1946 Bermuda Agreement, contending that it no longer corresponded
satisfactorily to the conditions of the 1970s.5 Under the terms
of that agreement, air service would continue for one year after
either country's repudiation. As June 22, 1977, drew nearer,
U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Brock Adams
indicated that unless a new agreement were signed, airline
services between the two countries would cease. 6 The threat* B.A., 1966, University of Michigan; J.D. candidate, University of Denver College of Law.
1. TRAvEL AGENT, May 30, 1974, at 6.
2. Note, A New Era in InternationalAviation: CAB Regulation, Rationalization
and Restrictionism on the North Atlantic, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 317, 352 (1974).
3. Excess capacity is not defined solely as unutilized capacity but the "unused
capacity of the aircraft below a certain standard percentage of the aircraft capacity
which must be sold to ensure an economical operation of the route concerned over a
certain period of time (critical load factor)." H. WASSENBERGH, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

Am

TRANSPORTATION LAW IN A NEW ERA

31 (1976).

4. Air Services Agreement with the United Kingdom, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499,
T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda 1.
5. Letter from British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham to the U.S. Department
of State (June 22, 1976).
6. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 30, 1977, at 26.
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ened disruption was averted,
however, and Bermuda II was
7
1977.
23,
July
on
signed
The hallmark of the original Bermuda Agreement was its
lack of formula or any other method for the predetermination
of capacity Capacity was to be "adequate to the traffic demands between the country of origin and the countries of ultimate destination," 9 that is, third and fourth freedom traffic. 0
Air carriers of Great Britain and the United States remained
free under this provision to set trip frequencies unilaterally.
Bermuda I also provided that if either country became dissatisfied with what it regarded as excessive capacity on the part of
the other country's carrier(s), it could request consultations.
The flexibility of Bermuda I was everywhere praised, and it
served as the basis of hundreds of similar bilateral agreements
governing air transportation."
Several factors, however, had combined to render the 1946
Bermuda Agreement an anachronism in the 1970s. Beginning
7. Air Services Agreement with the United Kingdom, July 23, 1977, - U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda III.
8. Capacity is defined as the "maximum amount of payload which could be carried, in the same direction along the route for which payload is determined, as limited
. . .by available seating capacity ..
" H. WASSENBERGH, POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE AIR 46-47 n.5 (1962). But
it is a well known fact that operating a transport service at an overall load
factor of more than 65 or 70 per cent of its capacity is not a sound
proposition; in these circumstances quite a number of the individual
services are fully booked and the operator would on many occasions have
to disappoint prospective passengers.
Van der Turk Adriani, The "Bermuda" Capacity Clauses, 22 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 406,
409 (1955). The same holds true today.
9. Bermuda I, Final Act, para. 6.
10. First Freedom: The right to fly across the territory of a foreign country
without landing.
Second Freedom: The right to land for non-traffic purposes.
Third Freedom: The right to set down in a foreign country traffic coming from United States territory.
Fourth Freedom: The right to pick up in a foreign country traffic destined for the United States.
Fifth Freedom: The right to carry traffic from a point of origin in one
foreign country to a point of destination in another foreign country.
Stoffel, American Bilateral Air Transport Agreements on the Threshold of the Jet
Transport Age, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 119, 122-23 n.6 (1959).
11. A survey of the more than 1,000 bilateral agreements registered with the
International Civil Aviation Organization indicates that the great majority follow the
principles enunciated in the first Bermuda Agreement. Goedhuis, The Air Charter
Market and the Restrictive Effects of Current Bilateral Agreements: Changes in the
Approach to InternationalAir Agreements, 77 AERONAUTICAL J. (London) 25, 26 (1973).
-
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with 1958 the substitution of jet aircraft for propeller driven
planes dramatically increased the number of available seats on
the North Atlantic. As the number of restrictions limiting
charter flights was gradually lifted in the past two decades,
capacity again burgeoned. A factor, too, was the proliferation
of foreign carriers entering the market. As new countries
emerged from colonial bonds, they viewed the airplane as a
unique ambassador, and international institutional bodies
loaned funds to these nations to develop "state" airlines.
The integrity of the Bermuda capacity principles had also
been weakened by the number of capacity reduction agreements entered into not only among U.S. international carriers
but between the United States and Great Britain. In addition,
internal U.S. administrative regulations" having the force and
effect of law were enacted to deal with what the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter CAB) viewed as the inability of Bermuda I to ensure prompt reaction to decisions by other countries affecting air transportation. In essence, these regulations
empowered the CAB to request any foreign carrier operating
under a permit"3 to this country to file traffic and schedule
data. A third factor subverting the original capacity principles
was the emergence throughout western Europe of airline pooling agreements.
The vague capacity principles of Bermuda I were set forth
word for word in the main body of Bermuda II, but the heart
of the second Agreement is contained in Annexes One and Two
which deal respectively with Route Schedules and Capacity on
the North Atlantic. The capacity annex provides for the service
plans of each country's carriers to be scrutinized in advance of
12. 14 C.F.R. § 213.1-.6 (1977).
13. A foreign air carrier may not engage in scheduled or nonscheduled air transportation to or from the United States without a permit issued by the CAB. Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970 & Supp. II 1972). However, in issuing any
such permit the Board is directed to "do so consistently with any obligation assumed
by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force
between the United States and any foreign country." Id. § 1502.
The permit must also be approved by the President. Id. § 1461. By Executive
Order No. 11920, President Gerald Ford established procedures for executive branch
review of decisions submitted to it by the CAB. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (1976). However,
a CAB Advisory Committee recently recommended, as did the American Bar Association, that the Federal Aviation Act be amended to withdraw from the President this
power of approval. CAB ADVISORY CoMMITrEE, REPORT ON PROcEDuRAL REFORM 24
(1975).
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implementing annual schedules. In addition to this frequency
control mechanism, Bermuda II employs a second method of
capacity limitation: carrier designation. Only one U.S. and one
British carrier will be permitted to serve twelve of the fourteen
U.S. cities having nonstop links with London.
Although both U.S. and British negotiators hailed Bermuda II as a "satisfactory" accord," opposition surfaced when
the details of the new pact became known. The thrust of the
opposition was that Bermuda II, insofar as it restricted capacity, was anticompetitive and therefore contrary to the Federal
Aviation Act's mandate of competition. President James E.
Carter, in a letter addressed to various Cabinet heads some two
months after Bermuda II was signed, expressed belated dissatisfaction over the capacity restrictions. He declared that the
United States "should be bold in granting liberal and expanded access to foreign carriers . . . in exchange for equally
valuable benefits we receive from those countries."' 5 He proclaimed a "new" policy, which suggested a repudiation of the
new Agreement and which embodied the theme of the old.
"Our policy should be to trade opportunities rather than restrictions.""'
Despite the strong accusations leveled at the Agreement
by the President and others, this writer believes that Bermuda
II represents one solution to what the CAB viewed as the most
salient characteristic of the international air transportation
industry of 1975: excessive capacity producing uneconomical
levels of passenger load factors. 7
It is not disputed that the new Agreement is noncomprehensive in its coverage. Although it makes charters the subject
of Article 14 and Annex 4, it merely calls for the two countries
to enter into bilateral charter negotiations. In addition, the
supersonic Concorde is specifically exempted from its capacity
provisions. 8 Nor does Bermuda II address itself to the slowly
14. Morgenthaler, Britain Gets Less than It Sought in New Air Pact, Wall St. J.,
June 23, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
15. Karr, CarterReadies Aggressive U.S. Strategy to End Restrictions in Foreign
Air Pacts, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
16. Id.
17. CAB, REPORT TO CONGRESS FIscAL YEAR 1975, at 2 (1976).
18. Bermuda 1I, annex 2, para. 8. In return, however, the United States may not
be required, under the frequency control mechanism of the Agreement, to operate less
than seven round trip flights per week between Washington and London. Id.
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increasing number of pooling arrangements entered into between western European nations.
However, Bermuda II represents a positive step toward
curbing the excessive capacity that has plagued North Atlantic
air operations and which Bermuda I was unable to contain.

Alan Boyd, head of the U.S. delegation to Bermuda II, defended the Agreement in testimony before a Senate aviation
subcommittee. He foresees the Agreement as increasing "the
efficiency of airline operations by forcing more careful planning." 9
Observers speculate that the U.S. concessions in Bermuda
II will act as dangerous precedents for the forthcoming U.S.
bilateral air transport talks within the next three months with
Japan,2" Italy,2 and Australia and fear a country-by-country
blackmail. This writer contends, however, that the assumption
that Bermuda II will be a blueprint for bilateral discussions
with countries whose postures remain divergent from those
embodied in the U.S.-British pact is wrong. That Bermuda I
served as a pattern for similar agreements with other countries
does not, ipso facto, dictate that Bermuda II serve in the same
manner. Bermuda I, in contrast to Bermuda II, contained
vague and ambiguous phraseology which rendered it adaptable
to virtually any set of political and economic realities existing
between any two nations. Bermuda II, on the other hand, was
adopted with the specific purpose of stemming the overcapacity characterizing the U.S.-Great Britian route sector. Moreover, Bermuda II represents a compromise tempered by differing economic and political viewpoints embodied in relations
between two specific countries.
The history of the original Agreement, the reasons for its
repudiation, and the substance of both Agreements will be ex19. Griffiths, Bermuda Pact Provisions Backed, Av.

WEEK & SPACE TECH.,

Dec.

5, 1977, at 23.
20. Japan and the United States recently decided to defer further negotiations
until spring 1978 in view of Japanese concern that the present congressional dissatisfaction with the U.S. trade deficit vis-a-vis Japan would result in Japan making
undesired concessions in the air transportation agreement in exchange for Congress'
failure to enact punitive trade measures. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 2, 1978, at
31.
21. Initial negotiations in November 1977 produced a stalemate over the issues of
capacity reduction and carrier designation. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 21, 1977,
at 27.
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amined in an effort to demonstrate that Bermuda II establishes
an orderly and efficient response to the haphazard conditions
.confronting international airline traffic between the United
States and the United Kingdom.
II. HISTORY OF THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT
Bermudas I and II were essentially compromises between
the relatively competitive philosophy espoused by the United
States and the protectionist viewpoint of the British. The
Agreements must be read in light of the bargaining postures of
the two countries at both the 1946 and the 1977 bargaining
tables.
A.

The Early Years

The year 1929 found the United States and the United
Kingdom in complete agreement with respect to international
freedom of the air for the last time. At the International Commission for Air Navigation, both countries advocated permitting airlines of any country to land freely anywhere in the
world. 2 This camaraderie would soon evaporate, however, for
the difference in the strength of the internal air transport services of each country, already pronounced in 1929, would continue to increase.
U.S. planes in 1928 traveled approximately 10.5 million
miles over 36,300 miles of air routes, while British planes flew
one-tenth the number of miles over one-quarter the air route
mileage.2 3 Many immutable factors had favored the more rapid
expansion of the U.S. aviation industry. In Great Britian it is
impossible to get more than 100 miles away from the sea,
22. R. C~vEANv & L. NEVILLE, THE COMING AIR AGE 68 (1944). The Dutch and
Swedish delegates also favored the U.S.-U.K. position, but the 27 other countries
attending the Commission vetoed this stance.
23. [19291 ANNUAIRE DE L'AERoNAUTIQUE 31-35. The number of passengers and
the amount of freight carried did not demonstrate the same variance. Whereas U.S.
planes carried 49,713 passengers and 1,848,156 pounds of freight, Great Britain's
planes transported 36,769 passengers in 1928 and 1,621,400 pounds of freight. Id. However, what was significant in the early days was not the number of passengers carried
nor the amount of freight transported, but the actual experience of the airlines, as
measured by the number of miles flown and the route mileage pioneered.
An even more startling statistic revealing the difference between the two countries
is the number of commercial planes used in 1928 on scheduled services. The U.S. fleet
numbered 268; the British, 29. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANN. REP. OF DIRECTOR OF
AERONAUTIcS 58 (1928). During 1928 U.S. aircraft industries churned out more than
4,300 aircraft, while Great Britain manufactured 204. K. COLROVE, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF AVIATION 14 (1930).
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whereas U.S. planes possessed the singular advantage of being
able to fly 3,000 miles from east to west coasts and 3,000 miles
from the northern to the southern borders without having to
bother with changes in language, currencies, and countries.
Moreover, because the British climate was not conducive to
flying without instruments, the internal airlines were slow to
develop .24
Originally, the British aviation industry operated without
subsidy. The two English companies which commenced service
to the continent in 1919 enjoyed no governmental largesse. But
because the two French concerns which competed on the London to Paris route were the recipients of generous amounts from
their government, it became apparent to British officials that
some form of assistance was necessary. In 1921 the British government adopted a temporary plan subsidizing the two British
companies.2" This assistance became more permanent when in
1924 the government merged four air companies into Imperial
Airways, Ltd. and subsidized the new monopoly to the tune of
137,000 pounds per annum. 6 In 1936 a new competitor on the
scene, British Airways, was also granted annual operating
sums.27
Many writers surprisingly cite the American development
of aviation as occurring without governmental financial assistance. Although the United States did not pay out-and-out
subsidies, indirect subventions were granted in the form of contracts for carrying the mails. Reimbursements were placed at
higher rates than the revenue recovered by the government
from the public in the form of airmail stamps, and the infant
28
airlines flourished.
The American cause was also aided by the fact that the
domestic airlines did not engage in destructive competition for
the overseas routes. The field was left wide open to Pan American Airways which pioneered the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the
South American routes.
24. C, GREY, THE CnIL AiR WAR 145 (1945).
25. K. COLGROVE, supra note 23, at 23.
26. Id. (approximately $342,500).
27. J. ROMEYER, LES GRANDS RE.SEAUX DE L'AIR 82 (1938).
28. Air Mail Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 359, 43 Stat. 805 (1925). In 1929, for example, $11,169,015 was paid out in the form of airmail contracts. [1929] POSTMASTER
GEN. ANN. REP. 126.
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B.

The 1935 Agreement
The United States and the United Kingdom, along with
Canada and Ireland, sat down at the bargaining table in 1935
to discuss transatlantic routes and landing privileges. It was
not until the following year, however, that permits for reciprocal privileges were issued. These permits provided for two
round trip flights per week between London and New York with
landing rights in Canada, Newfoundland, and Ireland." Under
the agreement, a flight could be operated at any fare the airline
chose. In addition, neither the United States nor Great Britain
could begin transatlantic service unilaterally. Such service was
required by the agreement to commence simultaneously. 0
But because the British had no suitable planes to endure
the rigors of an Atlantic crossing, and because it was unwilling
to permit Pan American Airways to get a head start, transatlantic service was not inaugurated in 1936, 1937, or 1938. 31 Unable to contain itself any longer, Pan American secured landing
rights in France in 1939. Faced with the prospect of traffic on
this important New York-Paris route bypassing Great Britain,
the British relented and permitted American carriers to land
in London although they themselves still possessed no aircraft
capable of crossing the Atlantic. 2
Meanwhile, in 1938, the faint outline of the airplane's role
as a political instrument was becoming visible. Despite the fact
that both the United States and the United Kingdom continued to proclaim the principle of freedom of the air, each began
a series of maneuvers to prevent the other from crossing the
continental and territorial borders of the other. Under the guise
of military security, the United States refused the United
29. U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE PRESS RELEASE,

XII, at 521 (Dec. 14, 1935).

30. Burden, The Future of Air Transport:An American View, in
AND CIVIL AVIATION 1944-1945, at 42 (Brabazon of Tara ed. 1945).
31. K. HUTCHSON, FREEDOM OF THE AIR 9 (Public Affairs Pamphlet

AIR TRANSPORT

No. 93, 1944).

32. Hackford, Our International Aviation Policy, 25 Haav. Bus. REV. 483, 484
(1947). Another agreement of April 6, 1939, established joint control by Great Britain
and the United States over Canton and Enderbury Islands in the Pacific. The agreement, which was to remain in effect until 1989, permitted use of the islands by only
civil aircraft and solely for the purpose of scheduled air services. 53 Stat. 2219, E.A.S.
No. 145. In the meantime, the United States in 1937 had authorized Imperial Airways
to inaugurate Bermuda-New York service, and Bermuda had granted landing rights
to the United States. G. GOODMAN, GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMERCIAL AVIATION
80 (1944).
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Kingdom (and all other foreign competitors) landing rights in
Hawaii.33 In turn, the British barred the United States from
Australia and also from Hong Kong.34
At the time transatlantic service was initiated in 1939,
American planes had flown five and one-half times as many
miles as had British aircraft, over two and one-half times the
route mileage; 35 1939 also found both Great Britain and the
United States sporting new domestic legislation in the air
transportation field. Congress had adopted the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938.36 All the powers over air transport held by
individual government agencies were molded into a new independent administrative body, the Civil Aviation Authority.
The Authority was granted extensive powers: all domestic and
international air transportation was placed under its control.
Although actions taken by the Authority with respect to permits for international air services were subject to the approval
of the President, such decisions were insulated from judicial
review. The Act also provided that air mail subsidy rates,
which had previously been set by the Post Office Department,
37
were henceforth to be determined by the newAuthority.
The declaration of policy which accompanied the Act appeared to favor competition over monopoly. It set forth various
considerations which the Authority was required to take into
33. K. HUTCHISON, supra note 31, at 9. Testifying on behalf of the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Clinton M. Hester stated that "[t]he major reason for refusal was
the government's willingness to expose its Hawaiian defenses to view from foreign-flag
airlines over which they would have little control." To Create a Civil Aeronautics
Authority: Hearings on H.R. 9738 Before the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 148 (1938).
34. 27 FORTUNE, Apr. 1943, at 72-74. The Hong Kong restriction was soon lifted,
however, when the Portuguese permitted Pan American Airways to fly into nearby
Macao. Id.
35. 1938 Statistics of RegularAir Service of PrincipalCountries, in AIR TRANSPORT
AND CIVIL AVIATION 1944-1945, at 274 (Brabazon of Tara ed. 1945). American aircraft
flew 81 million miles, eight times that of 1928. The route mileage had doubled, too, to
71,200. Id. In addition, American manufacturing companies in 1937-1938 accounted for
over 45% of all aircraft exports. In contrast, the export sales of Great Britain, France,
Italy, and Germany combined were over $68,000,000 less than that exported by the
United States. E. FREUDENTHAL, THE AVIATION BUSINESS 267 (1940).
36. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977 (current version
at Federal Aviation of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970)).
37. Such amounts were not limited by statute, and Pan American Airways received between $21,500 and $23,600 from the Authority for each round trip flight in
1939. Hackford, supra note 32, at 485.
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account when passing upon the applications of both American
and foreign carriers to engage in transportation to and from the
United States:
(a) The encouragement and development of an airtransportation system properly adapted to the present and future
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices . . .
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States. ..... 1

In the same year over in Great Britain, an Order in Council39 issued pursuant to the Air Navigation Act of 19364o established the Air Transport Licensing Authority. This threemember Authority was empowered to grant or deny licenses for
internal air transport.
C.

The War Years

Early into World War II, President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill verbally contracted that the United States
would supply the necessary transport planes while Great Britain furnished the military aircraft." To the American aircraft
industry, this represented a great challenge which was eagerly
taken up. Because the United States concentrated on manufacturing regular transport aircraft, no new civil aircraft were designed in Britain during the war.42
Two other differences contributed to the strong position of
the U.S. airlines emerging from the shadows of the war and the
relatively weak stance of their British counterparts. The American carriers were under contract to the government, whereas
the British airlines were seized. And in contrast to American
38. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 2, 52 Stat. 980 (current
version at Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970)).
39. No. 613 STAT. R. & 0. 53 (1938).
40. Air Navigation Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & 1, Edw. 8, c. 44.
41. H. SMITH, AIRWAYS ABRoAD 70 (1950). This is an excellent and entertaining
account of the early international air relations between the United Kingdom and the
United States. Smith had access to the private diaries of Adolph A. Berle, Assistant
Secretary of State at the time of Bermuda I.
42. Hutchison, Imperialism of the Sky, 156 NATION 552 (1943).
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operations, where the airlines continued to be operated by
those who had done so before the war, British airlines were
dominated by the government.4
D. Postwar Maneuvering
Postwar debates in Great Britain, unlike those in the
United States, centered not so much around chosen instrument
versus multicarrier service as they did around the best manner
in which to build up a weakened competitive posture. Great
Britain was apprehensive of American competition: whereas
Americans flew 72% of the world's commerce in 1943, Britain's
share was only 12%."1 In spite of this, the small but determined
group known as the Little Englanders, who advocated shutting
off the Empire to all foreign competitors, met with stiff opposition. 5 The government spokesmen were cautious, however, to
refrain from advocating wholesale competition, as the Americans seemed to be doing. Lord Beaverbrook, who had been
appointed by Churchill to head the Civil Air Transport Committee to revive the British air transport industry after the war,
addressed himself to the remarks of U.S. Congresswoman Clair
Booth Luce: "We want to fly everywhere. Period."" "Complete
freedom of the air in the present state of the world," said he,
"might result in commercial anarchy."47
In outlining British civil aviation policy before the House
of Lords, Beaverbrook presented the government position of
setting national quotas and of an "equilibrium between transport capacity and the traffic offering on any international
route." The British Government believed that with its share
of international air traffic assured and with the Americans unable to pick up all the traffic, British aviation could hold its
own. This posture, unacceptable to the Americans, was outlined in the first British policy statement or "White Paper. 49
The White Paper indicated the willingness of Great Britain to accept the first four freedoms of the air in a multilateral
agreement. The fifth freedom, however, was to be accorded
43. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 74.
44. Id. at 109.
45. Id. at 113.
46. 89 CONG. REC. 759-64 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Luce).
47. 130 PAlL. DES., H.L. (5th ser.) 462 (1944).
48. 131 PARL. DES., H.L. (5th ser.) 694 (1944).
49. Am MINISTRY, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT, CMD. No. 6561 (1944).
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only through bilateral negotiations. Britain believed that this
restriction would protect the weaker countries from the overpowering U.S. competition. Britain also urged the creation of
an international aviation authority which would enforce the
application of the fifth freedom restriction.
E. The Chicago Conference
Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle, prodded by the
prospect that Great Britain was soon to issue invitations to an
international aviation conference, called a meeting to be held
in Chicago in November 1944.0 Although many looked to the
International Civil Aviation Conference (hereinafter Chicago
Conference) to solve the world's postwar aviation problems,
they were to be disappointed. The Conference, however, was an
important part of the history of aviation, for it opened up the
world's air routes.
The British were prepared to rely on the White Paper,
whereas the American delegation, headed by Berle, operated
independently of the so-called Biddle Report. This document,
which was the only published doctrine on America's postwar
civil aviation plans, agreed that the rapid development of air
commerce would necessitate a supranational governmental
body and urged the creation of an experimental authority of
this sort."1 Although the report declared that America would
decline to take advantage of its superior resources to dominate
world air commerce, it opposed the many types of restrictions
favored by the British.
The nations at Chicago quickly aligned themselves into
countries advocating freedom of the air and those favoring
order of the air. Great Britain installed itself as the leader of
the latter viewpoint, and the United States became the leading
proponent of the former. Great Britain's predetermination of
capacity principle, as expressed in the White Paper, involved
an initial allocation of capacity with an escalator clause. At the
outset, each country would be permitted capacity sufficient to
meet one-half of the forecasted traffic between points of departure and destination at a 60% load factor. If a carrier operated
on the average at more than a 65% load factor, it would be
50. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 158.
51. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT Poucy, H.R. Doc. No. 142, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1945).
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permitted a capacity increase. 2 If, however, its load factor
should fall to less than 50% after the additional capacity had
been added, then the increase would be withdrawn.
The draft multilateral convention presented at the Chicago Conference by the United States provided for the mutual
granting of all five freedoms. As to the international body with
authority to oversee fifth freedom operations, the United States
remained hostile. It did agree, however, to the institution of an
international authority which would control standardization of
airports and operating procedures. 3 The fifty-one other participants at the Conference failed to adopt the U.S. scheme and
the Conference, deadlocked, ended without resolution of the
major issues. 4
The Conference was not a complete failure, however. The
International Air Services Transit Agreement, which gathered
a number of signatories, provided for the mutual granting of
the first and second freedoms of the air, the so-called
"technical" or "operational" freedoms.5 5 Also adopted was the
International Convention on Civil Aviation which provided for
the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter ICAO) .1
F. Pre-BermudaI
Shortly after the Chicago Conference, a skirmish arose
between Great Britain and the United States which pointed to
the necessity of some sort of agreement to end the frequent
squabbling and to present a united front among the postwar
democracies.
Pan American Airways announced plans to inaugurate its
postwar schedules with a generous fare reduction on the New
York-London run.57 In addition to the two flights per week permitted under the 1935 agreement at any fare the airline chose,
Pan American had been operating three additional flights at a
52. B.

CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT

422 (1962).

53. W. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION As AFFECTED
SOVEREIGNTY

BY STATE

97 (1970).

54. F. THAYER, AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ANALYSIS 76 (1965).
55. H. WASSENBERGH, POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL CIvI. AVIATION POLICY AND THE
17 (1962).
56. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 185.
57. L. ZACHAROFF, THE WORLD'S WINGS 261 (1946).

LAW OF THE AIR
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tariff agreed to by the British. 8 The United Kingdom promptly
informed the U.S. State Department that unless Pan American
ran the flights at the mutually acceptable tariff, it would no
longer be allowed to operate the additional flights; instead, it
would be limited to the flight frequency of the 1935 agreement.59 Pan American then relented, and the original tariff was
reinstated.
After the fracas, in which most nations supported the
British position, George Baker, a former Civil Aeronautics Authority member and the head of the U.S. delegation, came to
the first Bermuda negotiations prepared to make certain concessions with respect to rates. Great Britain, on the other hand,
in the market for a sizeable U.S. loan and frightened by the
revolt of Pan American, came to Bermuda ready to sacrifice its
cherished demand for capacity predetermination."
Ill. BERMUDA I
The participants at the bargaining table in 1946 did not
possess equal strength in terms of civil air power. In return
merely for the United States agreement to the setting of fares
through the International Airline Transport Association
(IATA), Great Britain had to abandon the capacity predetermination principles which it had sought.
Under Bermuda I"' the air carriers of each country were to
be accorded "a fair and equal opportunity" to operate on any
route between the two nations. The primary objective of the
Agreement was the "provision of capacity adequate to the
traffic demands between the country of which such air carrier
is a national and the country of ultimate destination of the
traffic. 6' 2 The only limitation on the number of allowable
flights was set forth in an often overlooked provision that "the
interest of the air carriers of the other Government shall be
taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services
'6 3
which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes."
58. Id.
59. Id. at 262.
60. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 256-57.
61. For a thorough analysis of Bermuda I and its capacity principles, see Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future of
BilateralAir Transport Agreements, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 419-95 (1975).
62. Bermuda I, Final Act, para. 6.
63. Id. para. 5.
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The restrictions on fifth freedom traffic were slightly more
stringent, but equally as imprecise as the third and fourth freedom limitations. Fifth freedom capacity was to be related
(a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the
countries of destination;
(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the
airline passes after taking account of local and regional services."

Alongside the vaguely worded capacity restrictions rested
an equally imprecise form of enforcement. Paragraph nine set
forth the intention of the parties to engage in regular consultations in order to implement the capacity principles." In the
event that neither country could agree on acceptable capacity
levels, an arbitration procedure could be invoked."6 In addition,
either party could terminate the Agreement with a one year
notice. 7
"Adequate" capacity was nowhere defined or measured in
the Agreement. Nor could standards be found to indicate what
level of capacity would be deemed inadequate, or, at the other
extreme, excessive. Capacity was thus left to the discretion of
the individual airline to institute subject only to a review by
the other country's government. 8
The ambiguous phraseology of Bermuda I rendered it subject to varying interpretations. The fifth freedom limiting language was used by nations favoring restrictive policies to interpret the Bermuda principles as "protectionist." Nations favoring freedom of the air, on the other hand, utilized the very same
language to construe the principles as "liberal."
A government supporting the "liberal" interpretation
could seize upon the requirement that fifth freedom capacity
be related to "the requirements of through airline operation."
It could claim that without fifth freedom traffic on the final
segments of a New York-London-Rome-Bombay-New Delhi
64. Id. para. 6.
65. Id. para. 9. This method of consultation has come to be known as ex post facto
review.

66. Bermuda I, art. 9.
67. Id. art. 13.
68. One writer described Bermuda I as a "sort of 'gentlemen's agreement' not to
do anything that is too unreasonable, or at least not to expect to go on doing it for any
great length of time." W. O'CONNOR, ECONObnc REGULATION OF THE WoRLD's AiRmINEs:
A PouncAL ANALYsis 46 (1971).
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route, its airline could not afford to fly from New York to India
on a profitable basis. Along the same lines, this government
could contend that since its airline passed through the various
fifth freedom cities only once a day, it was therefore "taking
account of local and regional services."
The opposing government could select the "traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of destination" language. It could argue that under the primary
objective of the Agreement, or the provision of "adequate" capacity, the other country's carrier was operating at a greater
capacity level than the third and fourth freedoms would warrant.
The "fair and equal" opportunity language was not intended by the parties to be equated with a 50-50 share of operations, rather with the opportunity to attempt to gain a certain
share." But in the years immediately preceding Bermuda II,
Great Britain and the United States appeared to be interpreting the phrase to mean equality of market shares. England
clamored for a 50-50 split of the transatlantic market instead
of the 40% share it had previously held, despite the fact that
Americans accounted for 60% of the passengers traveling across
the North Atlantic.70 Even after Bermuda I was signed, Great
Britain hinted that a 50-50 division was its ultimate goal. Patrick Shovelton, Deputy Secretary of the United Kingdom's
Department of Trade and its chief negotiator at Bermuda II,
stated that "the fact remains that we do not have an equal
opportunity to compete on all routes."'"
The United States, too, in capacity negotiations in 1974
and in 1975 attempted to invoke the Bermuda principle of "fair
and equal opportunity." It sought to ensure equal benefits to
Pan American Airways with KLM, SAS, and Sabena Airlines
in their respective operations to the Netherlands, Scandanavia,
and Belgium.7 2
If equality of shares had been intended by the contracting
69. Van der Turk Adriani, The "Bermuda" CapacityClauses, 22 J. AIR. L. & COM.
406, 409 (1955).
70. Kaplar, US., Great Britain Fight New Air War over the Atlantic, NAT'L J.,
Jan. 1, 1977, at 23.
71. Av. DAILY, Oct. 11, 1977, at 213.
72. H.WAsSENBERGH, supra note 3, at 12.
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parties to Bermuda I, they would have had to have required one
country's carriers, more specifically those of the United States,
to lower the capacity levels to those of the other country's carriers. Such a formula would have directly contravened the nonpredetermination principles of Bermuda I. Moreover, Dr. G.
Goedhuis, a public international aviation authority, observed
that if traffic is to be equated to other forms of production, "it
is difficult to see why, in the field of aviation, there should be
a claim for equal division which is not made for the production
'73
of grain, machinery, frozen meat, etc.
IV. THE DEMISE OF BERMUDA I
A. The Introductionof Jet Aircraft
The factor that contributed most significantly to the
mushrooming growth of capacity was the introduction between
1958 and 1963 of the jet aircraft. In 1959 the average number
of seats per aircraft was 74. By 1961 that figure had climbed to
124. 71
Prior to the substitution of the jet, air carriers had relied
on aircraft such as the Douglas DC-7, which had a seating
capacity of 89 coach passengers. In contrast, the Boeing 707120, which supplanted the DC-7, could carry 160 coach passengers across the Atlantic. 75 In 1969 the first wide-bodied jet was
introduced into North Atlantic service, again causing a jump
in unutilized seats. By March 1977 the average number of seats
on American international flag carriers had increased to 232.5,
more than trebling the 1959 average.78
Had the airlines curtailed the frequency of their flights to
accommodate the increased number of seats offered on each
flight, capacity would not have increased so dramatically. But
because air carrier managements believed the passenger to be
solely interested in convenience of schedule, the airlines found
little incentive to decrease the number of flights offered.
73. Goedhuis, supra note 11, at 27.
74. Wheatcroft, The Influence of Operationaland Technical Factorson Air Transport Regulation, 74 AERONAUTICAL J. (London) 623, 627 (1970).
75. Sackrey, Overcapacity in the United States International Air Transport
Industry, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 24, 77 (1966).

76. CAB, BUREAU
9 (Mar. 1977).
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B.

CAB Liberalizationof Charter Rules
A substantially greater number of charter flights also contributed to the excess capacity problems. In 1961 international
charter flights across the North Atlantic carried less than
204,000 passengers. Ten years later, this number had increased
to 1.9 million passengers."
Beginning in 1959 the CAB promulgated a series of regulations easing the number of restrictions that had formerly limited charter carriers. The inevitable result was a further increase in total capacity. After the CAB authorized foreign air
carriers to engage in charters to off-route points in 1959, the

number of charter flights more than doubled." Sensing a
broadening of CAB charter policies, the supplemental79 air carriers applied for and received permission to perform transatlantic charter services in 1960.10 In the same series of orders, the
Board also removed restrictions on split charters (charters with
more than one group) and charters to organizations with a
membership numbering over 20,000. In addition, the order permitted travel agents to organize charters. 8'
In 1963 the CAB authorized the granting of charter-only
air services to foreign air carriers, thus opening the transatlantic market to an additional number of new entrants.8 2 This was
followed several years later by the CAB granting inclusive tour
charter authority to the supplementals 3 Alarmed, the scheduled airlines challenged this order.
77. Lichtman, Regularization of the Legal Status of International Air Charter
Services, 38 J. Ant L. & COM. 441, 447 (1972).

78. K. PU.LAI, THE Am NET: THE CASE AGAINST

THE

WORLD AVIATION CARTEL 161-

62 (1969). In 1957, 524 one-way charter flights were operated on the transatlantic route;
by 1960 this number had increased to 1,532. Id.
79. "'Supplemental air carrier' means on air carrier holding a certificate of public
convenience and necessity authorizing it to engage in supplemental air transportation." Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(33) (1970). '"Supplemental air
transportation' means charter trips, including inclusive tour charter trips, in air transportation, other than the transportation of mail by aircraft, ...
to supplement the
scheduled service ...
" Id. § 1301(34).
80. No. CAB-11908 et at, Order No. E-16023, Nov. 14, 1960.
81. K. PILLUA,
supra note 78, at 164.
82. Caledonian Airways (Prestwick) Ltd., Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 38 C.A.B.
501 (1973). There are at present 92 foreign charter-only carriers operating between the
United States and their homelands. CAB, REPORT TO CONGRESS FIscAL YEAR 1975, at
12 (1976).
83. Reopened Trans Atlantic Charter Investigation, decided March 11, 1966,
served after President's approval on Sept. 30, 1966, Order No. E-24240.
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In Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB the Second Circuit found that the Board's statutory authority to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity for supplemental air
transportation which had been defined in the Supplemental
Air Carrier Act of 1962" as "charter trips in air transportation"
did not include the authority to grant certificates for inclusive
charter tours.8 5 The fact that this decision was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in World Airways, Inc. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc.u proved of little assistance to the scheduled carriers.
That very same year Congress expanded the definition of supplemental air transportation to include the conduct of inclusive
tour charters. 7
The seventies also saw a significant expansion of the number of charter services. During 1975 the CAB relaxed the requirements for travel group charters (TGCs).8s As a result,
TGC filings for 1975 tripled over the previous year. 9 In 1976 the
CAB approved Advance Booking Charters (ABCs) on a five
year experimental basis. The ABC passenger was not required
to be a member of an affinity group, nor did he have to purchase a ground package with his air transportation. 0
In view of the number of international discount fares being
allotted to scheduled carriers, the CAB recently issued notices
of proposed rulemaking to liberalize charter flights for the supplementals." The proposed regulatory reform bills introduced
by Senators Cannon and Baker also would greatly broaden
supplemental charter transportation requirements. 2
84. Supplemental Air Carrier Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(34) (1970)).
85. 380 F.2d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 1967).
86. 391 U.S. 461 (1968), aff'g by an equally divided court Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967).
87. Pub. L. No. 90-514, 82 Stat. 867 (1968) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(34)
(1970)).
88. Travel Group Charter regulations permit any group of 40 or more persons to
be organized for the purpose of chartering all or part of an aircraft provided that they
conform to certain specified conditions. Keyes, The TransatlanticCharterPolicy of the
United States, 39 J.Am L. & CoM. 215, 239 (1973).
89. CAB, supra note 17, at 12.
90. TRAFmc WoRa , Sept. 13, 1976, at 150. The Advance Booking Charter requires
the prospective traveler to purchase a round trip tricket from an independent charter
operator or a travel agent a specified number of days in advance of the flight departure
date. Id. The advance booking period for European charters is 45 days. This period
will be shortened to 30 days after October 1, 1978. Id. at 151.
91. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24, 1977, at 28.
92. Id. June 20, 1977, at 33.
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C.

Capacity Restriction Agreements
The various capacity reduction agreements entered into in
the past ten years have also acted to undermine the vitality and
authority of Bermuda I's capacity principles. In 1974 the CAB
approved capacity restriction agreements between the United
Kingdom and various American cities 3 on the grounds that
such limitations could "help to provide the public with optimum service in the face of the constraints imposed by the
international fuel situation.""
An attempted agreement in 1976 failed to materialize. The
British had notified Trans World and National Airlines that
they would be unable to provide the amount of North Atlantic
frequencies during the winter season that the airlines had desired to operate. The CAB viewed this notification as a violation of Bermuda I requiring "appropriate retaliatory response '' 5 and issued two orders in quick succession. The first
commanded British Airways to file its existing and planned
flight schedules. The second commanded the airline to reduce
its daily nonstop DC-10 round trips from Los Angeles to London to five per week. President Ford, believing recission to be
in the best interests of foreign policy, disapproved the Board's
orders. The British in turn accepted the originally proposed
winter schedules.
The two U.S. flag carriers also adopted a capacity pact.
Pan American Airways and Trans World Airlines agreed to
discontinue head-to-head competition on most of their North
Atlantic routes due to the massive operating losses that they
had been experiencing during 1974. They implemented an
93. CAB Order No. 74-10-6, Oct. 2, 1974.
94. With respect to capacity reduction agreements within the domestic U.S. market, the CAB Report on Regulatory Reform noted that, whereas the agreements implemented during the fuel crisis were justified in line with Federal Energy Administration's objectives of fuel consumption reduction, approval of capacity limiting agreements in nonemergency situations "would represent a radical departure from the
Board's previous pro-competitive policies and from generally accepted antitrust principles." CAB, REGULATORY REFoRM: RE'oaT oF THE CAB SPECcL STAFF 95 (1975). (This
Report was never formally endorsed by the entire Board.)
The Board made it clear, however, that international capacity agreements represented a different story. "The views expressed by the Board, . . . relating to domestic
capacity agreements, cannot be applied in international capacity agreements without
taking into account the often decisively different circumstances which prevail in the
international arena." CAB Order No. 75-7-98 (1975).
95. TRAnc WoRLD, Nov. 1, 1976, at 92.
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agreement whereby Pan American would, inter alia, suspend
service between the United States and France, Austria, Portugal, Spain,9" and Casablanca. In return, Trans World agreed to
refrain from transatlantic service between the United States
and Germany and to suspend through plane service between
Washington, D.C. and London. The CAB approved the agreement in January 1975 for a two year term. 7
In June 1976 the District of Columbia Circuit in Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB"5 vacated the CAB's order of approval.
The court found that the two year operational period was excessive in the absence of an evidentiary hearing wherein opposing carriers could present objections. 9 The court also rejected
the two year term because the Board had failed to secure the
approval of the President. 00° On remand, the CAB issued an
order authorizing the route exchange to continue until March
1978.'"1
Claiming that further frequency reductions were needed
on several international routes, Trans World Airlines in early
1978 sought CAB permission to engage again in intercarrier
talks on capacity limitation. The CAB denied the request, however, asserting that any unilateral capacity diminutions attempted without corresponding reductions by foreign carriers
would place the United States in an inferior competitive posture.' 2 The Board pointed out that the 1973 fuel crisis had
triggered the earlier discussions and that factor was lacking in
the present circumstances. 3
D. CAB Economic Regulations, Part 213
In an effort to improve the economic position of the American flag carriers whose share of international traffic had been
96. PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, INC., ANN. REP. 17 (1976). The Miami-San JuanLisbon-Madrid-Rome route was excepted, however.
97. CAB Order No. 75-1-1133 (Jan. 30, 1975), reconsiderationdenied, Order No.
75-2-108 (Feb. 27, 1975).
98. 539 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
99. Id. at 752.
100. Id.
101. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.-Trans World Airlines, Inc. Route Agreement,
[1977] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 22,228. However, both airlines informed the CAB that
they would not apply for an extension of the 1975 agreement when it expires in 1978.
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 5, 1977, at 30.
102. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 16, 1978, at 34.
103. Id.
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steadily worsening and because of the proliferation of international airline pooling agreements," 4 the CAB enacted part 213
of its Economic Regulations in June 1970. °5 Part 213 empowers
the CAB to' request, with or without a hearing, any foreign
carrier operating under a permit to file traffic and schedule
data disclosing the extent of that carrier's operations to and
from the United States. 0 8 If the services provided by the foreign
carrier are subject to a bilateral air transport agreement, an
additional finding must be made before the Board can request
such data. It must find that the permit holder,
over the objections of the United States government, [has]: (1)
Taken action which impairs, limits, terminates, or denies operating rights, or (2) otherwise denied or failed to prevent the denial
of, in whole or in part, the fair and equal opportunity to exercise
the operating rights, provided for in such air transport agreement .... 107

The CAB is then authorized to notify the foreign permit
holder that its operations are not in accord with applicable law
or "adversely affect the public interest."'" 8 The CAB may then
order the foreign carrier to refrain from implementing a proposed schedule or to discontinue an existing schedule within
thirty days.0 9 Before issuing such orders, however, the CAB is
required to secure the approval of the President."0
The CAB explained its rationale for adopting part 213 in
Foreign Air CarrierPermit Terms Investigation."' The Board
believed that the ex post facto review mechanism of the
Bermuda-type agreements to which the United States was a
party encouraged other countries to take restrictive action
against U.S. carriers without the United States being able to
impose prompt, reciprocal restrictions.
So long as the United States is forced to follow procedures under
which retaliatory action is long delayed, foreign governments will
104. Note, CAB Regulationof ForeignAir Carriersunder Part 213: A Turn toward
Restrictionalism in American Aviation Policy, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 239, 244

(1971).
105.
however.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

14 C.F.R. § 213.1-.6 (1977). Canadian air carriers are exempt from Part 213,
Id. § 213.1.
Id. §§ 213.2, 213.3(b).
Id. § 213.3(c).
Id. § 213.3(d).
Id.
Id.
54 C.A.B. 175, 177-78 (1970).
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not regard the threat of U.S. retaliation as a serious deterrent.
Only by adopting part 213 can this Government increase the
likelihood that other governments will abandon unilateral restrictionism. 112

One questions, however, whether part 213 was the appropriate response to what the Board viewed as coercion by other
countries. It is submitted that alternative procedures would
have been less abrasive, such as amending the existing bilateral agreements."'
E. Pooling Arrangements

Pooling agreements among western European nations have
been in existence since Bermuda I was signed."' By the summer of 1951, fifteen separate pooling agreements were engaged
in by nine different airlines." 5 By 1954, fifty-six different route
sectors were the subject of pooling arrangements."'
In 1959 Air-Union, a pooling arrangement of commercial
and technical operations covering Air France, Lufthansa, Sabena, and Alitalia Airlines, came into being. The airlines
agreed on traffic quotas of 34%, 30%, 10%, and 26% respectively." 7 But because of disputes relating to traffic apportionment and national control, the agreement collapsed in the sixties."'
112. Id. at 178.
113. Other measures adopted to curb discriminatory practices engaged in by other
countries against U.S. flag carriers include the International Air Transportation Fair
Competitive Practices Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1159a, b (Supp. V 1975). This Act
requires the Secretary of Transportation to survey the charges made to U.S. air carriers
by foreign governments for the use of airports and airways and requires the CAB and
the Secretary of State to take such steps as necessary to eliminate practices or reduce
charges that the Secretary of Transportation finds discriminatory or unreasonable.
The CAB also adopted an amendment effective September 10, 1977, that will
require foreign carriers proposing to transit the United States to file notice of their
intention to transit 15 days prior to the flight. The amendment authorizes the Board
to halt such flights pending a review of any questions existing with respect to their
operations under the International Air Services Transit Agreement. Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 8, 1977, at 31.
114. For an article dealing with the early postwar attempts of European airlines
to enter into pooling agreements, see Wager, InternationalAirline Collaboration in
Traffic Pools, Rate-Fixing and Joint Management Agreements (pts. 1, 2), 18 J. Am L.
& COM. 192, 299 (1951).

254 (1956).
Id. at 255.
R. DAVIES, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S AIRUNES 515 (1964).
Pourcelet, The InternationalElement in Air Transportation,33 J. AIR L. &
79 (1967).

115. S. WHEATCROFT, THE ECONOMICS OF EuaOPEwN AIR TRANSPORT

116.
117.
118.
COM. 75,
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In 1973 the Committee on Economic Affairs of the Council
of Europe proposed capacity control over scheduled North Atlantic services in a Resolution to the Council." 9 The European
Parliament had also recommended to the European Economic
Community's Council of Ministers that a common system of
capacity control over chartered services be developed. 2 0
The arguments for pooling are essentially threefold.' By
assessing the demand on subject routes and adjusting schedules so as to meet this demand, higher load factors will result.
Increasing the load factor is the most profitable way to ensure
a sound economic posture because revenue per mile is increased without a corresponding cost rise. A second argument
in favor of pooling is that it results in a significant reduction
of operating costs. By eliminating duplicative traffic and by
utilizing aircraft personnel more efficiently, it is predicted that
an airline can reduce 30-35% of its total operating costs.' 22 The
third reason cited in favor of pooling is that such arrangements
benefit the public. Left to their own devices, airlines would
schedule flights only during periods of peak traffic requirements. If resources were to be pooled, however, the airlines
would provide a better spread of services throughout the day.
William Jordan predicts that airline pooling arrangements
would increase the duration of aircraft replacement cycles and
23
would cause the abandonment of service and quality rivalry.
It has also been suggested that cooperation among nations with
respect to airline traffic encourages the breaking down of other
political barriers as well.
Jordan points to the fact that load factors on intraEuropean routes increased from 61.6% to 63.3% in one year as
a result of pooling agreements allowing direct control of seating
capacity. 2 1 Jordan also recognizes the casualties of such agreeWASSENBERGH, supra note 3, at 137.
120. Id.
121. Straszheim notes the different types of pooling agreements in existence: market sharing agreements, equipment pools, space leasing arrangements, spare parts
pools, maintenance pools, collective training agreements, and joint purchasing agreements. M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 60-63 (1969).
122. S. WHEATCROFr, supra note 115, at 259.
123. Jordan, Airline CapacityAgreements Correctinga Regulatory Imperfection,
39 J. AIR L. & COM. 179, 208 (1973).
124. Id. at 208 n.98. Contra is a study compiled by the Air Research Bureau of
six routes covered by pooling arrangements where the passenger load factors were lower

119. H.
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ments: discharged employees no longer working, suppliers of
resources no longer needed by the airlines, and aircraft manufacturers being put out of business.'2 5
V. U.S. AIR TRANSPORTATION POLICY
Despite the excessive capacity occasioned by the factors
listed in the previous section and the weakening of the capacity
principles of Bermuda I in the face of CAB promulgations,
capacity reduction agreements, and pooling arrangements, the
United States continued to support the 1946 Agreement.' The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was declared in much the same
manner as its 1938 predecessor to foster air transportation and
to preserve competition among air carriers.'2 In 1963 President
John F. Kennedy's Statement on International Air Transportation Policy affirmed U.S. approval of the Bermuda capacity
principles and reiterated opposition to any inflexible determination of capacity. Kennedy believed that the principles accommodated "the general good, the legitimate economic inter128
ests of all nations engaged in international air transport.'
At the time of Kennedy's statement, however, almost half,
or 47%, of the 20.3 billion passenger-seat-miles flown by international carriers went unutilized. 'M But the opportunity to
modify Bermuda I in order to curb capacity went unheeded
when the Agreement was amended in 1966. Although the U.S.
Department of State claimed that the amendment
"represented the most far-reaching review . . . that the two
Governments have undertaken since that agreement was origion all but five. S. WHEATCROrr, supra note 115, at 261. However, this study was
performed in the early fifties.
125. Jordan, supra notes 123, at 209.
126. Representative of the many critics of the continued adherence to Bermuda I
principles by the United States was Oliver Lissitzyn, author of InternationalAir Transport and National Policy. He believed that the present regime had a "tendency in the
direction of maintenance and operation of excessive capacities which makes the entire
industry less economical." Lissitzyn, Freedom of the Air: Scheduled and NonScheduled Air Services, THE FREEDOM OF Tm Am 96 (E. McWhinney & M. Bradley
eds. 1968).
127. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
128. Statement on International Air Transport Policy, Apr. 24, 1963, reprintedin
D. BLvou, AIR LAw 292 (1964). Such statements do not have the force of law but are
intended as advisory statements to be used by government officials in dealing with
aviation matters.
129. CAB, OFFICE OF CARRIER AccouNTs AND STATISTICS, Ant CARRIER ANALYTICAL
CHARTS 10-12 (Dec. 1963).
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nally signed,"13 0 no mention was made of the capacity disequilibrium.
In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon's Statement of International Air Transportation Policy echoed President Kennedy's support of the Bermuda principles even more forcefully.
The Bermuda capacity provisions have served both the United
States and international air transportation well in providing a
liberal economic environment for the conduct of international air
services. Attempts to restrict United States carrier operations
abroad should be vigorously opposed, and where required, the
United States should take appropriate measures against the carriers of foreign countries restricting United States carrier operations in violation of the terms of bilateral agreements or of the
3
principles of reciprocity.' '

The greatest irony is to be found in the CAB Annual Report to Congress for fiscal year 1975. On one hand, it decries
the "excessive capacity" that "produced uneconomical levels
of passenger load factors.' ' 3 Further on in the Report, however,
one reads that the Bermuda principles
are not an argument against freedom from any control of capacity, but rather they are an argument for first allowing each carrier
to exercise its judgment as to capacity needs in the light of its
determination of market conditions or opportunity.
The cause of international air transportation has been well served
by the economic environment fostered by the Bermuda principles.13

Why, then, did the United States continue to rely on Bermuda I in the face of excess capacity and the resultant lower
profits of U.S. flag carriers? 34 The most plausible theory is a
recognition on the part of the United States that the country
making a unilateral capacity reduction might well incur serious
losses because of aggressive competitors. The experience of the
U.S. domestic airlines points out the ineffectiveness of unilateral capacity reductions in a competitive market. A study of
130. 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 954-55 (June 13, 1966).
131. Statement of International Air Transportation Policy, June 22, 1970,
reprinted in 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 651, 654 (1970).
132. CAB, supra note 17, at 2.
133. Id. at 16.
134. One writer suggests that the United States viewed the original Bermuda
capacity provisions as possessing a kind of moral force and was therefore reluctant to
disturb them. Jones, The Equation of Aviation Policy, 27 J. AIR L. & CoM. 221, 232
(1960).
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market share changes over a thirteen month period in three
different city-pairs demonstrated that the airlines which had
added additional' capacity gained heightened market shares at
the expense of the airline which had acted on its own to reduce
capacity.'35
Another domestic study shows that on a competitive route
served by two carriers, the airline providing the smaller share
of seats (30%) will "very often" receive a smaller share of the
total number of passengers (little more than 20%). 13 The car-

rier providing 70% of the seats, on the other hand, will get a
"disproportionately larger" portion of the passengers (approximately 80%).'13 A recent study by the National Productivity

Commission further documents the close relationship between
seating capacity and market shares. It determined that the
most powerful force in shaping market shares is "simply
the
1 38
relative number of flights offered by each competitor.'
VI. BERMUDA II

The first indication of a change in U.S. policy came with
the International Air Transportation Policy Statement of President Ford in September 1976.'31 Although calling for "reliance
upon competitive market forces to the greatest extent feasible," the policy statement recognized that capacity agreements
may be necessary in situations where "excess capacity has a
serious adverse impact on the viability of services and where
public interest is served by adequate scheduled service by a
U.S. carrier." 0 The Statement stressed that such agreements
should be of a temporary nature and that agreements between
carriers would be preferable to agreements between governments.'4 '
135. R. VAMBERY, CAPITAL INVESTMENT CONTROL IN THE AIR TRANspoir INDUSTRY

213 (1976).
136. W. FRUHAN,
137. Id.

138. J.

JR., THE FIGHT FOR COMPETrTIVE ADVANTAGE

FRIEDMAN,

A NEw

126-27 (1972).

AIR TRANSPORT POLICY FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIc

33

(1976).
139. 12 WEEKLY Comp. OF Pass. Doc. 1319 (Sept. 8, 1976). Dr. H. Wassenbergh,
however, termed it a .'fighting document' to primarily advance the interests of the
United States' international carriers." Wassenbergh, The Special Air Transport Conference of ICAO April 1977: A New Basis for the Trade in Traffic Rights for International Air Services, 42 J. Am L. & CoM. 501, 502 n.4 (1976).
140. CAB, REPRT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YE 1976, at 79 (1976).
141. Id.
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In the meantime Bermuda II negotiations had commenced. The participants at the 1977 bargaining table were
again unequal in posture. In 1976 U.S. carriers earned $375
million on the North Atlantic run, while state-owned British
Airways collected $274 million.' Fifth freedom rights beyond
London to other European capitals and to the Far East had
garnered $170 million for U.S. carriers during 1976, whereas
British carriers received only $8.5 million 4for
fifth freedom
3
rights beyond the continental United States.
In Bermuda II, however, the pendulum swung not in favor
of regulated competition as it had in 1946, but toward a dual
capacity control mechanism: carrier designation on specific
routes and a frequency control formula.
A. CarrierDesignation
The first method of capacity control is carrier designation.
Although the number of U.S. cities" that will have nonstop
5
links to London has been increased from nine to fourteen,"
only one U.S. and one British carrier will be allowed to serve
6
twelve of the fourteen."

In three instances an additional carrier may be designated
to serve a one-carrier gateway: 1) if one country decides not to
142. TIME, July 4, 1977, at 64.
143. Id.
144. The Miami-London route is subject to an agreement negotiated in October
1976 dealing with summer season capacity. It is essentially a compromise wherein
National Airlines receives the right to continue its summer frequencies (six flights per
week between Miami and London) in return for limitations both with respect to the
number of seats it can offer as well as to the fares it will be permitted to charge. In
addition, National did not receive any fifth freedom rights beyond London. ECONOMIST
(London), June 4, 1977, at 98.
145. Wilkin, New U.S.-British Air Pact Will Affect Travel Habits, N.Y. Times,
June 23, 1977, § A, at 7, col. 1. Atlanta, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Houston, and Anchorage
were added. Houston, however, may not be served nonstop by a U.S. carrier until three
years after Bermuda II has been in force. Bermuda II, annex 1, § 1, US Route 1 n.1.
The same restriction applies to British carriers serving Atlanta and Dallas/Ft. Worth.
Bermuda II, annex 1, § 3, UK Route 1 n.1.
146. Two U.S. and two British carriers will be permitted to serve both New York
and a second U.S. gateway to be designated by the CAB. Bermuda II, art. 3, para. 2(a).
(b). Boston was temporarily authorized as the second two-carrier gateway in October
1977. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 7, 1977, at 32. However, the CAB requested
comments by January 13, 1978, as to whether Boston should retain its dual designation
or be replaced by Los Angeles. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 9, 1978, at 37. The second
British carrier on the New York-London run will be Fred Laker's Skytrain, much to
the displeasure of British Caledonian Airways. J. Com. (New York), June 24, 1977, at
1, col. 2.
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compete on the route or engages in token service; 2) if the
number of one-way revenue passengers carried by the designated airline of each country exceeds 600,000 in each of two
consecutive years; or 3) in the alternative, 450,000 passengers
in each of two consecutive years by one country's airline.'47
After the agreement has been in effect for three years, the
United States will be permitted to choose an additional U.S.
gateway city. One carrier from each country will be allowed
to
45
render nonstop service to that gateway from London.
The formerly liberal U.S. fifth freedom rights beyond London were severely limited except with respect to one carrier's
"round-the-world" service and various points in Germany.'
After three years, United States carriers must stop serving Belgium and Austria beyond London. After five years, ongoing
flights to the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden must cease. 50
In addition, the United States immediately gave up fifth freedom rights to twenty-two cities that are not presently being
served. 51
The British, in contrast, were granted fifth freedom rights
beyond Boston, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington/Baltimore to Mexico City, a lucrative market. 5 2 The
British were also authorized to serve all stops in Canada as
intermediate points from all British gateways 5 3 to Boston, Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, and
Washington/Baltimore. 4 Additional fifth freedom rights
gained by the British extend beyond Atlanta and Houston to
Venezuela, Columbia, Manaus (Brazil), and Peru.'1 Beyond
service is also permitted to Japan for flights from London via
Anchorage.
147. Bermuda II, art. 3, para. 2(b)(i)-(ii).
148. Bermuda I, annex 1, § 1, US Route 1 n.2.
149. Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Berlin. However, only one U.S. carrier
may serve each of these cities, with the exception of Frankfurt, to which two U.S.
carriers may fly. Id. n.3.
150. Id. n.2.
151. Brown, Compromise Marks Bilateral Pact, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June
27, 1977, at 26.
152. Bermuda I, annex 1, § 3, UK Route 3.
153. London, Manchester, Prestwick/Glasgow. Id. Route 2.
154. Id.
155. Id. Route 4.
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B.

Article 11-Fair Competition
Article 11 sets forth the "fair and equal opportunity" language 5 of the original Agreement and also the identical third,
fourth, and fifth freedom provisions of Bermuda P" It is the
very vagueness of the capacity clauses of Bermuda I, allowing
flexible and often diverse interpretations, which permits them
to rest alongside the more restrictive provisions of Bermuda II.
After setting forth the Bermuda I language, Article 11 proceeds to tie in tariffs for the first time to capacity offerings.
Frequency and capacity must be related to "public demand,"
taking into account the provision of "adequate service to the
public" and the "reasonable development of routes and viable
airline operations."' 58 Capacity is also to be provided at levels
"appropriate to accommodate the traffic at load factors consistent with tariffs" that are based on the criteria enumerated in
Article 12, Tariffs.'5 9 Although Article 12 sets forth several factors to be taken into account in setting fares, it merely provides
60
that tariffs should assume "reasonable load factors.'
Up to this point, the capacity provisions remain undeterminative, permitting each carrier to apply its own conception
of public demand to capacity offerings.
However, the next to last paragraph of the Fair Competition Article recognizes that excess capacity can be "counter to
the interests of the travelling public."'' Accordingly, it establishes Annex 2, Capacity on the North Atlantic, to be utilized
only with respect to the North Atlantic route sectors.
The paragraph embodying the purpose of the Annex reflects the deep division between the two countries on the capacity issue-the relatively unrestricted competition advocated by
the United States and the governmental regulation of capacity
favored by the British.
The purpose of this Annex is to provide a consultative process to
deal with cases of excess provision of capacity, while ensuring
156. "The designated airline or airlines of one Contracting Party shall have a fair
and equal opportunity to compete with the designated airline or airlines of the other
Contracting Party." Bermuda II, art. 11, para. 1.
157. Id. para. 3(a),(b),(c).
158. Id. para. 4.
159. Id.
160. Bermuda II, art. 12, para. 2.
161. Bermuda II, art. 11, para. 5.
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that designated airlines retain adequate scope for managerial
initiative in establishing schedules and that the overall market
share achieved by each designated airline will depend upon passenger choice rather
than the operation of any formula or limita2
tion mechanism."

The comments of American and British officials after the
signing of Bermuda II as to the purpose of this "consultative
process" mirrors the conflicting viewpoints expressed in the
paragraph. Alan Boyd, Special Ambassador and head of the
U.S. delegation to Bermuda II, sees the mechanism as "no
more than a consultative process."'' 3 Other U.S. negotiators
viewed the clause as putting pressure on capacity rather than
dictating market shares. 164 On the other hand, the British Secretary of State, Edmund Dell, sees the process as more of a
capacity limitation device in and of itself. "This is designed to
reduce the waste of fuel and other resources that results from
flying too many empty seats. .
".'."I"In defense of the American position, a similar process of prescreening of flight frequencies is provided for in several U.S. bilateral agreements,' but
representatives of the contracting nations point out that capacity has not been effectively curbed by the prescreening mechanism.'0 7
C.

PrescreeningProcedure and Fallback Mechanism
The second capacity limitation method utilized by Bermuda II is a relatively complicated prescreening procedure and
fallback mechanism. These provisions are at the heart of the
anticompetitive accusations leveled against Bermuda II.
Each air carrier must file proposed schedules 180 days in
advance of the summer and winter traffic seasons.' The schedules must specify the type of aircraft to be used, the destinations of the aircraft, and the frequency of the flights.' Amend162. Bermuda II, annex 2, para. 2.
163. Quoted in Barnard, US, UK Sign New Air Service Pact: Unlikely to Much
Alter Present Imbalance, J. Com. (New York), June 23, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
164. Bus. WEEK, May 9, 1977, at 32.
165. TRAFFIC WORLD, July 4, 1977, at 91.
166. E.g., Italy.
167. Karr, Anglo-U.S. Talks on New Aviation Pact Face Basic Hurdle and June
22 Deadline, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1977, at 6, col. 2.
168. The summer season includes the period April 1 through October 31. The
winter traffic season begins November 1 and continues through March 31. Bermuda
II, annex 2, para. 13.
169. Id. para. 3.
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ments to the original filings can be tendered but must be filed
165 days before the commencement of the season.7 0 Adjustments to these subsequent filings must be tendered on a
"timely" basis.
Should one of the governments (the "Receiving Party")
believe that an increase in frequency proposed by any of the
filed schedules does not conform to the fair competition principles set forth in Article 11, it may call for consultations with
the other government (the "Requesting Party") not later than
150 days before the beginning of the next traffic season. "1 In
its notice to the other government, the complaining party must
specify the reasons for its belief and indicate the frequency
level which it believes to be consistent with the agreement. "2
If, however, the level of frequency provided in the proposed
schedules to and from a gateway city is 120 or fewer round trips
during the summer or 88 or fewer round trips
during the winter,
17 3
neither party may complain to the other.

In reviewing the frequency level under dispute, the party
proposing the increased frequency is mandated to take into
account
the public requirement for adequate capacity, the need to avoid
uneconomic excess capacity, the development of routes and services, the need for viable airline operations, and the capacity offered by airlines of third countries between the points in question."'

After such review, the Requesting Party must, not later than
120 days before the traffic season in question, notify the other
government of the level of frequency it believes to be in conformity with Article 11.1'5
If the Receiving Party does not agree with the Requesting
Party's determination, it must notify the other party not later
than 105 days before the coming season. "' In the event of disagreement, consultations must be held not later than 90 days
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.

Id. para. 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

176. Id. para. 5.
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before the beginning of the next season. " ' At the conference,
the Parties must exchange economic data relevant to their frequency contentions and must compare forecasted levels with
the levels of the previous corresponding season.'
If no agreement on the number of frequencies has been
reached 75 days before the next traffic season begins, an automatic "fallback" mechanism would be triggered. This mechanism was contained in the White Paper submitted to the U.S.
government by Great Britain in preliminary talks held in December 1976.1
The carrier desiring the frequency increase will be able to
operate the frequency level it proposes.'8 However, this number must not exceed the sum of the number of round trip frequencies operated on the route segment in question during the
previous corresponding season' 8' plus the mean of the forecast
percentages presented by the carriers during consultation as
applied to the latter number.' In any event, however, the
increase could not be pared to less than twenty flights during
the summer traffic season or fifteen during the winter season. 3
Exempt from the fallback mechanism's operations are
carriers inaugurating service on a route already served by a
carrier of the other party. The exemption would continue in
effect for two years or until the frequencies of the newcomer
matched those of the incumbent, whichever occurred earlier. 8 ,
Carriers on both sides are not limited with respect to the
number of extra sections that each may operate to a flight,
provided that the extra sections are not advertised or held out
as separate flights. 85
The North Atlantic Capacity Annex has a five year lifetime. At the end of this period, the parties must agree to its
extension. If no agreement can be reached, the capacity provi177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 3, 1977, at 26.
Bermuda II, annex 2, para. 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 7.
Id. para. 10.
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sions will remain in effect for an additional two year period and
then lapse."
D. CharterServices
For the first time, charter services were placed in such an
agreement. 7 Article 14, Charter Air Services, alludes to the
realization of both countries that there is a "substantial and
growing demand from that section of the travelling public
which is price rather than time sensitive, for air services at the
lowest possible level of fares" and accordingly establish a separate annex to deal with charter services.' Annex 4, however,
states by omission that Article 3, Designation and Authorization of Airlines, and Article 11, Fair Competition, are not applicable to these services. 18' The Annex does commit the contract0 with a
ing parties to negotiations before the end of the year"9
view toward establishing a bilateral or hopefully even a multilateral agreement with respect to North Atlantic charter services.' In the event that the parties are unable to reach an
agreement by March 31, 1978, further consultations will be
had."

2

The charter provisions in Bermuda II have no real impact,
then, other than to obligate the two countries to sit down at the
bargaining table. Further weakening the charter provisions is
a paragraph stipulating that an agreement entered into on
April 1, 1977, between the two countries will be incorporated
3
by reference into the Annex."

186. Id. para. 12.
187. The United States had previously negotiated with several countries for bilateral charter agreements (e.g., Belgium), but these agreements were, according to the
1970 Statement on International Air Transportation Policy, separate and apart from
the corresponding agreements relating to scheduled services. Lichtman, supra note 77,
at 460. Aviation authorities agree that controlling scheduled capacity would save resources but it cannot be effective if charter capacity, with which it competes, is permitted to proliferate without restraint. J. FRiEDMA, supra note 138, at 139.
188. Bermuda I, art. 14, para. 3.
189. Bermuda II, annex 4, para. 2.
190. An October 31, 1977, meeting was held with the British. The results of the
Oct. 1977 meeting and the additional meetings in Feb. and Mar. 1978 produced an
agreement which, inter alia, rejected the concept of part charters, but reduced the
advance purchase requirement from 45 to 21 days and the minimum group size requirement from 40 to 20. Further meetings are scheduled for the fall of 1978. Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH.,

Mar. 27, 1978, at 25-26.

191. Bermuda II, annex 4, para. 3.
192. Id.
193. Id. para. 1.
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Ostensibly entered into in an effort to minimize the administrative workload of filing charter requests, the agreement
has the effect of granting both British Airways and British
Caledonian Airways blanket authorization to conduct off-route
charter flights between the United States and Great Britain
beginning May 31, 1978.'11
Nor did the new Agreement discuss the effect of pooling
arrangements. Although the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires each air carrier to file with the CAB a copy of every
contract or agreement into which it enters for the pooling of
services,'9 5 the Act does not expressly prohibit pooling. However, the CAB is given the affirmative duty of approving by
order any such agreement.9 6 In addition, it is empowered to
disapprove any arrangement that it finds to be contrary to the
97
public interest or in violation of the Federal Aviation Act.
In contrast to the relatively restrictive policies respecting
U.S. carriers, the United States has strongly encouraged air
carriers of smaller nations to enter into agreements with adjoining nations in order to combine air services to this country. The
latest "U.S.-mandated" regional pooling organization was the
grant of New York authority to Alia Airlines of Jordan in conjunction with Syrian Arab Airlines.9 8'
VII.

CRITICISM OF THE AGREEMENT

Most observers agree that on balance the British airlines
will realize greater benefits from the Agreement.' 9 The American opposition, however, centers not so much upon "how much
the British received as compared to the share of the American
airlines," but on the negotiating body, the form the Agreement
took, and the anticompetitiveness of the Agreement.
194. Memorandum of Understanding on Passenger Charter Air Services between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 13,
1977, at 47.
195. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1970).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 1382(b).
198. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 26, 1977, at 33. Recently, however, Saudi
Airlines of Saudi Arabia insisted on its own operating rights into New York apart from
the Alia-Syrian Arab consortium. The quid pro quo was the grant of operating authority to a U.S. flag carrier (Trans World Airlines) into Jidda, Saudi Arabia. Id.
199. British officials predicted that the new capacity mechanism would raise load
factors to 60-65% and that British Airways would gain three million pounds for each
percentage point increase. J. Com. (New York), June 24, 1977, at 15.
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A.

Criticism of the Negotiaiing Body
The Secretary of State is empowered to advise and consult
with the Secretary of Transportation, the CAB, and the Secretary of Commerce with respect to negotiating agreements with
foreign governments concerning air routes and services. 00 Criticism has been directed at the State Department, however, for
placing harmonious diplomatic relations before the economic
welfare of the U.S. airlines in its bargaining priorities and for
its lack of intragovernmental cooperation.101
The Carter administration recently submitted the draft of
a plan which would place the State Department in a negotiating position subordinate to that of the Department of Transportation. 0 2 Earlier administration plans had centered upon
the creation of a separate negotiations branch of the executive
203
department.
President Carter is also presently revising the 1976 Statement on International Aviation Policy of President Ford. In it
he is expected to delineate the chain of command in the new
reorganization, but he is meeting State Department opposition
to the loss of its ad hoc, moment-by-moment policymaking

powers .204
B.

Criticism of the Legal Status of the Agreement
20 5
In the United States, bilateral air transport agreements
are concluded without the advice and consent of the Senate
and are thus characterized as executive agreements rather than
as treaties. 20 1 Most countries, however, consider a bilateral
agreement a treaty.2 W.Shortly after Bermuda I was signed, considerable debate occurred in the houses of Congress as to the
legal status of that agreement; the debates reemerged after
Bermuda II.
200. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970).
201. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 16, 1976, at 106.
202. Doty, InternationalAviation Policy Shift Urged, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Feb. 6, 1978, at 36.
203. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 8, 1977, at 31.
204. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 19, 1977, at 33.
205. As of June 30, 1975, a total of 74 U.S. bilateral agreements were in effect.
CAB, supra note 17, at 16.
206. See Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air
Transportation(pta. 1, 2), 17 J. AIR L. & CoM. 436 (1950), 18 J. Ant L. & CoM. 12 (1951).
207. Id.
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Objections to having bilateral air agreements considered
as treaties include the inherent delay of congressional deliberation and the intertwining of basically air transportation issues
with politics? 8s One solution would be that introduced by Senator Smathers of Florida in 1957. Decisions that called for foreign policy or for national security considerations would be the
exclusive province of the President; agreements concerning
purely economic issues would remain outside his control.2"9 Difficulties with this solution center around whether economic,
military, and political interests in any given case would be
clearly distinguishable and capable of compartmentalization.
C. Criticism of the Capacity Control Measures
Another challenge to the Bermuda Agreement is that by
restricting the number of carriers as well as capacity, it may
violate U.S. antitrust laws.2 10 The recently concluded hearings

of the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Public Works and Transportation point out that the capacity
and airline designation provisions are contrary to the Federal
Aviation Act's mandate of competition."' The Senate Commerce Aviation Subcommittee also called for hearings.
Several court challenges are being organized by Ralph
Nader's Consumer Action Project and by Tampa, Florida,
which was named as a gateway city in the TransatlanticRoute
Proceedings but which was excluded by Bermuda II.21I
VIII.

CONCLUSION

President Carter's displeasure with the Bermuda capacity
limitations, evidenced in letters concerning present bilateral
negotiations with Japan, is curious.2 1 He expressed no disa-

greement with the 1976 International Air Transportation Pol208. Av. WEEK & SPACE

TECH.,

Aug. 8, 1977, at 31.

209. SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, IMPROVEMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN AIR COMM., S. REP. No. 119, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1957).
210. Av. DAILY, Oct. 5, 1977, at 189.

211. Letter from Rep. Glenn M. Anderson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation,
and Rep. Norman Y. Mineta to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (Oct. 5, 1977),
reprinted in Av. DAILY, Oct. 7, 1977, at 204.
212. Ellingsworth, Bermuda Pact Sparks Opposition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 1, 1977, at 26; Av. DAILY, Oct. 5, 1977, at 189.
213. Letters from President James Carter to the Attorney General, Chairman of
the CAB, and the Secretaries of State and Transportation (Oct. 7, 1977). Stressing the
importance of a healthy international air transport industry, Carter called for the
avoidance of governmental restrictions on capacity.
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icy promulgated by President Ford until one month after Bermuda II had been signed. Nor did he object to Bermuda II until
this time. Administration officials stated, however, that once
the full details of the new agreement became known to the
President, he "was less than pleased." ' Carter is expected to
include "very pro-competitive" guidelines in his new International Air Transport Policy. However, this policy will not be
promulgated as public papers, as were the former International
Air Transportation Policy Statements of Presidents Kennedy,
Nixon, and Ford.
The new Chairman of the CAB, Alfred E. Kahn, a Carter
appointee, also charged "that Bermuda 2 was a vehicle for anticompetitive intrusion into the international aviation marketplace." 15 Although his criticism is echoed by John Barnum,
Deputy Secretary of Transportation from 1973 to 1977, who
called for "giving up Bermuda 2,"11 and others, the opponents
fail to take into account the very pressing need for filling the
overabundance of empty seats.
In 1976 the total number of seats offered on the North
Atlantic was 15,820,020.17 Over 6 million of those seats flew
empty."' In March 1977 the number of available seats on the
North Atlantic was 1,159,709, a 6.5% increase over the same
period,"' and the March 1977 load factor had decreased 3.4%
from March 1976.20 Predictions were also being made that an
800-seat airliner would be in service by the end of the cen2
tury. '
The critics of the new Agreement also fail to realize that
in Bermuda II neither government actually possesses a veto
right over capacity. Even if the carriers are unable to reach an
agreement, flight frequencies may be increased, albeit by a
predetermined formula.
214. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 12, 1977, at 29.
215. Griffiths, Bermuda 2 PrinciplesDropped, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 23,
1978, at 31.
216. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 23, 1978, at 31.
217. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 25, 1977, at 37.
218. Id.
219. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 29, 1977, at 30.
220. Id.
221. Wilkinson, The Role of Advancing Technology in the Future of Air
Transport, 81 AERONAUTICAL J. (London) 185, 186 (1977).
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Bermuda II remains essentially the middle-of-the-road
approach and the compromise between two conflicting philosophies which characterized Bermuda I in 1946. The absence of
a strict formula for determining capacity is balanced by a prescreening mechanism which limits the discretion of the individual carriers.
Moreover, like many general principles, the Bermuda I
capacity provisions could work only when both sides agreed as
to their meaning. But because of the differing philosophical,
political, economic, and geographic criteria applied by each
country, widely diverging interpretations resulted. The fault of
Bermuda I was not in what it said but what it left unsaid.
Bermuda II at least attempts to say what needs to be said.

